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Germany has always been one of the major direct investment destinations for Korean multinational
enterprises (MNEs) within Europe. However, along with the internationalization of Korean firms, the
motives and patterns for direct investments have changed. This paper discusses the development of
Korean MNEs’ investment motives and patterns, specifically regarding the role Germany has played
over the years. For this purpose, geographical configuration patterns of the largest Korean MNEs within
Europe are analyzed. The main findings indicate that Germany is considered more important to auto-
mobile companies than electronics companies, and that the investment activities of small and medium-
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1   Introduction
 












 outward foreign direct investment has been rising consistently during the past decades, reaching
a record volume of over 15 billion US dollars in 2007. Experiencing fast track internationalization, large
Korean conglomerates like Samsung, LG and Hyundai have become major players in the international
markets. These large multinational enterprises (MNEs) have spread their activities worldwide, creating
added value in selected locations.
Europe has become the second largest direct investment destination for Korean firms. In particular, large
MNEs have invested heavily in Europe. In 2007, Korean firms invested nearly 4 billion US dollars in




 Germany, as well as the UK and
the Netherlands, has been one of the major European investment destinations for Korean companies. Ko-
rean companies started their European operations with sales subsidiaries in the major European markets:
Germany, UK and France. However, since the opening of the Eastern European markets, a substantial
number of investments have been flowing into countries like Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia,
the latter of which became the European production base for large Korean MNEs. Not only sales and
production operations are located in Europe, but Korean MNEs’ European operations have also grown
from mere sales activities to regional full-scale operations including sales, production, logistics, re-
search, and headquarters activities.
This paper discusses how Germany’s role as a direct investment destination for Korean firms has
changed over the years. For this purpose, the geographical configuration of the biggest Korean multi-
nationals, Samsung Electronics, LG Electronics, Hyundai and KIA Motors will be examined. By ana-
lyzing where and why these major investors located their activities within Europe, the dynamics of the
relationship between investment motives and location decision can be understood. The conclusions
gained from this analysis can then be used to comprehend the development and changes in Germany’s
role in the configuration of Korean companies.
This paper is structured as follows. First, a brief overview concerning the characteristics of Korean direct
investments (DI) in Europe and Germany will be given. Second, the European geographical configura-
tion of the aforementioned Korean MNEs will be analyzed. Finally, Germany’s role in Korean direct








   Korean Foreign Direct Investment in Europe
 
Europe has become one of the largest FDI destinations for Korean firms. The main target regions for
Korean FDI are Asia, North America and Europe. Asia, especially China, makes up the largest portion.
Since 2000, Europe has been catching up to North America and outpaced it in 2001, 2002 and 2007. The
investments have been mostly sales driven, the percentage for market entry and export promotion made




 In Europe, the ratio of large company investors is signi-
ficantly higher than in other regions. Regarding the accumulated amount of investment since 1998, large
companies have made up 87% of the total investment towards Europe, whilst for Asia and North Ame-
rica the percentages were 58% and 72%, respectively. The main target countries, as measured by the
accumulated amount of investment since 1968, are the Netherlands, UK and Germany followed by
Poland, Norway and the Czech Republic. Measured by the total number of investments, Germany heads
 
1 This is the revised version of a paper presented at the “Korea Conference” on 14th November 2008 in Düsseldorf, Germany, or-
ganized by Prof. Dr. Werner Pascha and the author on behalf of the Institute of East Asian Studies (IN-EAST) of Duisburg-Essen
University and the Düsseldorf Chamber of Industry and Commerce, in cooperation with the Bonn Branch of the Embassy of the
Republic of Korea, the German-Korean Chamber Seoul, and the German-Korean Business Association (DKW). Financial support
from the Zustiftung Familie Horstmann of the Haniel Foundation for the conference and for the research project on which this
paper is based is gratefully acknowledged.
2 In this text, Korea always refers to South Korea.
3 Data from Korea Eximbank.
4 Data from Korea Eximbank. 
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 The main industries have been manufacturing,





 For the last five years, a substantial amount of money has been invested in non-financial





Comparing the three major Western European investment destinations, the following characteristics can
be summarized (see Table 1). In Germany, the top 30 investors were almost exclusively automobile and
electronics companies. Furthermore, Germany has attracted more companies than the UK and the
Netherlands in the past. In the UK, the largest investors have been electronics and financial companies.
Several manufacturing plants have been located there, mostly from the big electronics firms, and there
have been consistently high investment volumes since 1990. Moreover, The UK has the most balanced
ratio between large companies and SMEs (small and medium enterprises). Many holding companies are
located in the Netherlands. It has the largest accumulated investment amount among European countries
due to some large-scaled joint ventures. The largest one was the joint venture between LG Electronics




   Korean Direct Investment Characteristics in Germany
 
The main characteristics of Korean FDI in Germany are illustrated in Table 2. According to data pro-





 Again, the main motives are market entry and export promotion. The proportion
of SMEs investing in Germany is increasing rapidly. Since 2000, more than half of the investment pro-
jects in Germany were carried out by Korean SMEs. However, their share of the volume of investments




 The main target regions are Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia
and Baden-Württemberg.
 
5 Data from Korea Eximbank.
6 In the manufacturing sector, which makes up 50 % of total investments, nearly 80 % of the investors have been automobile and
electronics companies.














• Primarily automobile companies 
(especially since late 1990s)
• Predominately excellently auto-
mobile and electronics companies
• Largest number of  Korean compa-
nies (Germany around 300, UK 
around 200, The Netherlands 
around 100)
• Primarily electronics and financial 
companies
• Several manufacturing bases of 
Korean companies
• Consistently high investment vo-
lumes since 1990
• Most balanced ratio between large 
companies and SMEs
• Location of holding companies
• Largest investment amount among Euro-
pean FDI through JV between LG Electro-
nics and Philips (LG Philips LCD)
• Largest accumulated investment amount 
due to investments in holding companies
• Above average growth of Korean inward 
FDI since 2006
8 Note that although 49 % is categorized as manufacturing industry, this does not necessarily mean that the subsidiaries are manu-
facturing plants. Rather, they are in the manufacturing industry.










Source: Korea Eximbank (accumulated data from 1968 to 2008 measured by amount of investments), Unternehmensregister (Germany’s com-
pany register), own table
 
Main Motives Main target regions Company size
 
Manufacturing (49%) Market entry (38%) Hesse (48%) Large companies (88%)
Wholesale and retail (44%) Export promotion (30%) North Rhine-Westphalia (15%) SMEs (12%)
Finance (2%) Natural resources (18%) Baden-Württemberg (8%) Other (0% [0,002%]) 
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Figure 1 shows the distribution of Korean companies within Germany. The diagram demonstrates the
substantial the gap between Hesse and the other German states. The region in and around Frankfurt is
especially preferred. This diagram also illustrates how the geographical diversification among Korean
companies has progressed.
In the 1960s and 1970s, Germany was Korea’s number one European trading partner. However, not only
goods and services were exchanged, but with respect to labour migration as well, Korean nurses and coal
miners were hired by the German government to cover labor shortages. The first corporate expansion
towards Europe took place in Germany: In 1970, the Korea Exchange Bank opened a branch office in
Frankfurt. This was the beginning of Korea’s link to the region in and around Frankfurt. Trading com-
panies were the first to follow, among them LG, Samsung and Daewoo. North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW)
and Hamburg were also preferred regions. In NRW, Düsseldorf was the first city where Korean trading
companies invested. The first company arrived in NRW in 1977. Retrospectively, it is difficult to gather
facts which would help explain the reasons Korean firms started to invest in NRW. One possible expla-
nation could be that Düsseldorf had been the center for Japanese companies. Since the Korean economy
was tightly linked to Japan in that period, it is plausible that the Korean companies followed Japanese




 was lower compared to other cities. Also,




. Consequently, these were
among the few regions where Korean communities existed. Last but not least, NRW had a high popula-




Hamburg was the premier location for shipping and logistics companies. During 1981 and 1990, LG
Electronics operated a factory in Worms (Rhineland-Palatinate). At the end of the 1990s, KIA and Dae-
woo entered Germany through Bremen. Samsung Corning established a factory in Tschernitz (Branden-






: Distribution of Korean companies within Germany
 
Source: Unternehmensregister (Germany’s company register), own diagram
 
10 Psychic distance describes the degree of familiarity with a location (see e.g. Johanson, J. and Vahlne, J. (1990), p. 13).
11 Both are cities in North Rhine-Westphalia.
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   Geographical Configuration of Four Korean MNEs
 
In this section, the location decision motives of Korean companies within Europe will be explained
based on case studies regarding the geographical configuration of the aforementioned Korean MNEs.
The reasons for selecting these companies were as follows: First, as we saw in the previous section,
Korean foreign direct investment in Europe has been dominated by large companies. The four compa-
nies selected made up the largest proportion regarding both the total amount and the total number of
investments. Second, only large Korean companies have a differentiated functional organization struc-




 and, thus, the exami-
nation of geographical (re-) configuration is not meaningful. And finally, by analyzing the configuration









   Theoretical Considerations
 
First of all, location decisions derive from the motives for the investment as well as from the resulting
role the established subsidiary is to play. The motives for investments vary significantly and can include




 The role of the subsidiary is de-
termined by the investment motive and the function which is going to be expanded. When the role of the
subsidiary is defined, the company identifies critical locational factors. In figure 2, major locational fac-
tors are listed according to a subsidiary’s role.
For sales subsidiaries, the most relevant issue is the proximity to the potential markets and customers.
Conducting sales activities involves more than promoting and selling products to customers. It also
includes tasks like gathering intelligence about customers’ taste, preferences or needs as well as the com-




 Therefore, indicators like GDP, population density and




 The location of any major customers can also
be an important consideration. Additionally, the information about customers and competitors has to be
transmitted to the headquarters. In general, an urban structure with sufficient access to information and
services as well as a good transport connection is essential.
Research on production site investment has been most extensive in comparison to other functions.




 For most industrial products, like
automobiles and consumer electronics goods, production is very price sensitive. Therefore, the most
important locational factors are costs, such as labor and real estate. Lower costs can also be achieved
through government subsidies or a favorable tax policy. Trade barriers, like tariffs or local content regu-
lations, can also stimulate production investment, since on-site production may reduce tariff-costs or
meet local content regulations.
Headquarters have similar needs as sales subsidiaries concerning urban structure and good transport
connections. Henderson et al. (2005) highlighted the importance of good access to information and
services, while Holt et al. (2006) discovered that headquarters were attracted by good communication,
education and transport infrastructure. According to the focus of activities, the proximity to strategically
important subsidiaries can be relevant as well. If the headquarter’s function is to coordinate regional
 
13 Own research.
14 The industrial structure in Korea has been very concentrated for a long time. Large companies dominated the markets and SMEs
were often just suppliers for the large conglomerates, so that their businesses were tightly linked to the businesses of the large
companies. Particularly in the capital- and technology-intensive industries, such as electronics and automobile industry, business
was dominated by large companies (see for example Cherry, J. (2001), Ch’oe, K.-C. (1992) or Shin, S.-H. (1998)).
15 See e.g. Dunning, J. (1998), p. 53, Borghoff, T. (2005), p. 65, Kim, Y.-C. und Choi, Y. (2004), p. 19 or Hur, J.-Y. (2007), pp.
440–442.
16 On-site presence of sales and marketing divisions are especially important if the customer needs are differentiated and market spe-
cific adjustments are necessary (Prahalad, C. and Doz, Y. (1987), pp. 18–21).
17 Holmes, T. (2005) examined the location of manufacturers’ sales offices in the USA and discovered that they are located nearby
big cities.
18 See for example Dunning, J. (1973), summary of FDI-Studies (pp. 296–297), Brush, T., Maritan, C. und Karnani, A. (1999) or
Blonigen, B. (2005). 
3   Geographical Configuration of Four Korean MNEs
 
               11
activities, proximity to key subsidiaries becomes more important, whilst activities aimed at integrating




The determinant factors for the location of R&D labs also vary according to the specific role. If the ac-
tivities are focused on exploiting existing knowledge and skills, proximity to production sites is favored.




   Case Studies
 
Data Collection.  
 
The data sources for the empirical research were annual reports from the companies,
press releases, newspaper articles and interviews as well as prior research results. Annual reports have
been publicly available for LG Electronics and Samsung Electronics since 1998, for Hyundai Motor
Company since 2000, and KIA Motors since 2006. The annual reports contain lists of overseas subsidia-
ries, their current locations and in some cases the year of foundation. They also provide data about new
establishments and the withdrawal and transfer of locations. Supplementary data was provided by
previous research e.g. Ch’oe (1992), Shin (1998), Cherry (2001) and Hyun (2003). News articles, press
releases and interviews with managers from the respective companies were used to identify reasons for
their location decisions. Interviews were conducted with one to three people, per company, from the
middle or upper management level.
 
LG Electronics.  
 
LG Electronics (hereafter called LG) first established a sales subsidiary in Germany in
1980, followed by a factory in 1986. Within a decade, they opened up sales subsidiaries both in the UK
and France. During the next seven years, sales subsidiaries were established in the five biggest markets
in Europe as well as Hungary and Poland. In 1997, production activities were moved from Germany to
the UK. 1998 saw the establishment of their European headquarters and logistic center in the Nether-
lands. During the next six years, LG’s European presence grew to include eight more sales subsidiaries,
an additional production plant in Poland as well as their first research and development and design cen-
ters in Europe. In 2006, LG closed its production facilities in the UK and transferred them to Poland.
Headquarters were moved in February 2007 from the Netherlands to London. The design center in Milan
was merged with the design center in London in 2008 (See figure 3).
 






: Influential factors for location decisions
 
Source: Own illustration based on Kuemmerle (1999), Mariani (2002), Henderson et al. (2005), Holt 
et al. (2006), Holmes (2005), Schmenner (1979), Brush et al. (1999) 
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Looking at the reasons for location choice, the following characteristics can be pointed out. Sales subsi-
diaries are mostly located in areas with a high population density and purchasing power, normally a ca-
pital city. Costs have been an issue, too. Nearly all sales subsidiaries are located in the suburbs rather
than the city center. One further commonality is that they are all located near a motorway. In conclusion,
the factors used to determine the location of sales subsidiaries can be summarized as follows: proximity
to a major market but at comparably low costs with motorway accessibility.





was chosen because of its proximity to the 
 













 As a result, in this case, the proximity to related institutions accounts for the
location choice. The transfer of the design center from Milan to London was explained by London’s




 Moreover, LG announced that it would make
London their European hub after relocating their headquarters to London only one year ago. The official
statement from LG states that London attracted their interest because of the business and financial en-
vironment and its global position. A more informal statement of a manager is that London was chosen
for the headquarters location because other large electronics companies such as Samsung are located







: Geographical configuration of LG Electronics’ European operations
 
Source: Own research and own diagram based on data from homepage, LGE Annual Reports (1998–2007), interview with LGE employees
 
20 This is stated on the company’s homepage.
21 According to LG’s press release from 8th December 2004.
22 According to a press release from 25th June 2008. 
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Figure 4 shows the shift of production activities over time. Clearly, display products dominate the pro-
duct portfolio. The plant in Worms also produced video recorders and cassette tapes. This plant served
the Western European market prior to 1989; after the reunion of Germany it began catering to the East
German market. After the East German market was saturated, the plant was closed and TV production
capacities were moved to the UK. In the late 1990s, LG expanded its production activities into Poland.
Only recently, all production activities have been moved to Poland. In Wroclaw, LG affiliates and part-
ners established a LCD display cluster.
Due to Germany being the only country where LG had a subsidiary, it is not surprising that they chose
to open a production facility in Germany as well.  Although this plant had been located in Germany for
quite a long time, it had to be shut down due to high wages and decreased demand from the new German
states. At the end of the 1990s, the South East of Wales had become a major site for electronics compa-
nies, among them Sony and Dell. This region offered comparably low wages and skilled workers. Howe-
ver, the competitiveness of this region faltered with the opening of the Eastern European countries, and




aw stated that Poland
was chosen, among other Eastern European countries, because of highly skilled work and a better infra-
structure.
 
Samsung Electronics.  
 
Samsung Electronics (hereafter Samsung) has a similar configuration pattern
to LG (see figure 5). Samsung also has, although less than LG, several sales subsidiaries in the major
European markets. Their production facilities are located in Eastern Europe as well, however in Slovakia
and Hungary rather than Poland. Samsung’s European plants have a clear focus on display products as
well. Both have logistic centers located in the Netherlands and headquarters located in London. Some
differences in the make-up between the two companies exist: Samsung has an additional logistic center






: Shift of production activities of LG Electronics
 
Source: Own research and own diagram based on data from homepage, LGE Annual Reports (1998–2007), interview with LGE employees 
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Their factory in Lisbon was the first to be established in Europe. This manufacturing subsidiary pro-
duced color TVs. The second plant they opened was in Wynyard (UK). There, they manufactured color
TVs, monitors and microwave ovens. This plant was enlarged to an integrated manufacturing complex
in 1996. Samsung opened up another plant in Hungary right after the fall of the Iron Curtain. The plant
in Barcelona, which was opened at the same time as the manufacturing complex in Wynyard, also
produced color TVs and video recorders. Like LG, Samsung transferred its production activities from
Western European countries to Eastern European countries. The production plant in Portugal was closed
first and the production capacities transferred to the UK. After closing Wynyard, color TV production
was moved to Hungary, while Spain’s production plant was transferred to Slovakia.
Samsung and LG considered similar factors when making their locational decisions. For sales subsidia-
ries, this especially holds true: They are situated in the suburbs of large cities. Even the regional head-
quarters is located in Surrey rather than in the central parts of London. This is mainly due to cheaper real




At the same time when Samsung enlarged the Wynyard factory, it established a R&D lab in London,
which supplies R&D support across Europe for Samsung’s production complexes. The lab focuses on
technological development and product design for a number of areas including telecommunications,




 One year later, an electromagnetic







: Geographical configuration of Samsung Electronics’ European operations
 
Source: Own research and own diagram based on data from homepage, SEC Annual Reports (1998–2007), interview with SEC employees
 
23 According to Google Maps, it takes 20 minutes from the headquarters to the airport by car.
24 Press release from 18th May 1996. 
3   Geographical Configuration of Four Korean MNEs
 
               15
But just as operations grew, there were also losses for the UK. In 2007, the European service and distri-
bution center was moved from UK (Telford) to the Netherlands (Breda) due to better proximity to Euro-
pean markets.
 
Hyundai Motor Company.  
 
The next two companies that will be analyzed, Hyundai Motor Company
and KIA Motors, merged in 1999. However, in this paper they will be treated as separate companies,
because, except for some financial connections, they behave as such.
In general, companies in the automotive industry have fewer self-owned sales subsidiaries than in the
electronics industry, choosing rather to find independent sales agents than to establish many sales subsi-
diaries. This is due to the very high costs and risks associated within these capital intensive activities.
Hyundai Motor Company (hereafter Hyundai) started its European operations in 1978 with independent
Dutch and Belgian distributors. During the 1980s, Hyundai spread out its sales activities throughout
Europe with independent sales agents in various countries. In an effort to coordinate European sales
activities, Hyundai established an office in Eschborn (Germany) in 1992. This office became the Euro-
pean headquarters in 2000. It moved from Eschborn to Rüsselsheim in 2003 and finally to its current
location in Offenbach in 2006. In 1998, Hyundai established a parts supply center in Lummen (Bel-
gium), not far away from the port of Antwerp. This subsidiary now belongs to Hyundai Mobis, a parts
supplier for Hyundai. A sales subsidiary in Poland followed in 1999 and a new R&D facility in Rüssels-
heim in 2003, where existing R&D activities from Hyundai and KIA were merged and increased.
Rüsselsheim and the adjacent region contain an automobile industry cluster, including the European
R&D base for General Motors. This region, therefore, offers a large pool of industry-related skilled
workers and a well-established network of suppliers. In 2005, Hyundai acquired full distributorship in




Currently, they have five sales subsidiaries located throughout Europe and a production plant is being
built in the Czech Republic. Independent sales agents, who are spread all over Europe, are not displayed
in figure 6.
With the exception of opening an office in Eschborn, Hyundai waited a long time before starting up self-
controlled operations in Europe. Only recently has Hyundai begun to set up a subsidiary network.
According to some research concerning the Korean automobile industry (e.g. Lautier (2001), Hyun
(2003) or Lansbury et al. (2007)), Hyundai’s internationalization strategy was at first more cautious,
concentrating on entering markets in developing countries. But with increasing global competition,
Hyundai was forced to pursue a more aggressive internationalization and marketing strategy to enhance
overall sales volume and secure its global position. In light of higher sales requirements, Hyundai has
had to extend its own operations in Europe in order to better coordinate activities and reach the com-
pany’s goals.
Again, the sales subsidiaries are located in big cities close to motorways. But in the case of Hyundai, the
locations were predetermined by the locations of the distributors they merged with (Milan, Oslo, London
and Prague). Only the German and Polish subsidiaries were established by Hyundai itself.





why Hyundai chose Eschborn as the starting point of its European activities is not quite clear. The most
simple answer might be that the airport in Frankfurt was, until recently, the only German airport which
had direct flights to Seoul. The office in Eschborn was established to coordinate regional sales activities.
The work in the office was therefore dependent on frequent exchanges with the companies’ headquarters
in Seoul. This meant that a reliable means of transportation to the central headquarters was essential. It





 A connection to prior investments can be found as well. The Hyundai Corporation, the for-




 As a result
 
25 Company’s press release (July 2005).
26 Interview result.
27 See Kuemmerle, W. (1999).
28 According to Germany’s company register. 
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there were already personal and institutional ties. Additionally, by co-locating the offices from Hyundai
Corporation and Hyundai Motor Company, synergies could be exploited.
 
KIA Motors.  
 
Considering KIA, a very similar configuration can be seen except for the fact that KIA has
many more sales subsidiaries. It is interesting to note that Hyundai and KIA operate two distinct head-
quarters but have a common R&D and design center. Although located in different countries, their pro-
duction facilities are only 95 km apart. In figure 7, independent sales agents are not displayed.
The most obvious question after looking at these figures is, why KIA Motors has so many sales subsi-
diaries while Hyundai does not. The answer is simple. KIA was forced to acquire the distributorship in
many cases because the independent sales agents would not continue selling KIA cars – cars from a com-




 So, external factors accounted for this expansion. The locations for the
sales subsidiaries were also predetermined, because KIA mostly acquired existing independent sales
agents. The location decision for the headquarters was also influenced by external factors. KIA followed
Hyundai from Bremen to Frankfurt.
To sum up the location decisions by the latter two companies: the sales subsidiaries are located mostly
in a country’s capital, similar to the electronics companies. But the location decision was often predeter-






: Geographical configuration of Hyundai Motor Company’s European operations
 
Source: Own research and own diagram based on data from the official Hyundai Motor Company website, HMC Annual Reports (1998–
2007), interview with HMC employees
Establishment of own subsidiary / Starting operations (through independent sales agent)
 
29 But despite difficulties to coordinate such a rapidly grown organization and a large financial burden, a marketing firm representa-
tive told me, that, retrospectively, this was not bad fortune for KIA. Through its large network of subsidiaries KIA is able to im-
plement marketing activities more effectively. Hence, KIA managed to close substantially the brand image gap between Hyundai
and itself. 
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dustrial cluster. The production facilities are located in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, two countries
where automobile production is prevailing. The production facilities are, as mentioned, not far away
from each other. Therefore, they are able to exploit synergies in supply and production. Due to being





   Analysis of Empirical Results
 
Looking at the empirical results, some characteristics of location decision can be pointed out. Sales sub-
sidiaries are located in large cities, usually the capital city, with good access to market information and
services as well as a good urban infrastructure. Large cities also offer high population density and
purchasing power. Another common feature of these locations is that they are situated near motorways,
which means that good transport connections are essential. These characteristics hold true for both elec-
tronics and automobile firms. These findings correspond to theoretical considerations. However, the
subsidiaries are mostly located in peripheral districts or suburbs of the cities. Since the role of sales sub-
sidiaries is to coordinate sales, rather than selling directly to private customers, it is not necessary for
them to be located in expensive central shopping areas. By locating the subsidiaries in peripheral
districts, costs can be saved.




 situated in the Eastern European countries. In the case of the electronic compa-
nies, the production sites moved from Western peripheral regions to the East. The main reason for this
concentration of plants in the East is lower wages. However, the companies did not choose the cheapest
countries like Romania or Bulgaria. Instead, they preferred comparably higher developed countries like






: Geographical configuration of KIA Motors’ European operations
 
Source: Own research and own diagram based on data from homepage, KIA Annual Reports (1998–2007), interview with KIA employees
Establishment of own subsidiary / Starting operations (through independent sales agent) 
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Regional headquarters’ locations present a less homogeneous picture. LG first placed its regional head-
quarters, together with its European logistics center, in Almere near Amsterdam. After almost ten years,
they decided to move the headquarters to London, where Samsung had already established its regional
headquarters. London is a major metropolitan city with a favorable business and financial environment.
This corresponds with the theoretical findings concerning the importance of urban structure as well as
communication and information infrastructure. At the same time, the headquarters are located in the less
expensive suburbs rather than in the center of the city. Obviously, practical factors like costs outweighed
representativeness. As mentioned, the reasons for the location decision for Hyundai’s regional headquar-
ters couldn’t clearly be identified. In KIA’s case, there was an external force: the merger with Hyundai.
Interestingly, Hyundai’s headquarters building is situated in Offenbach, with a suburban-like distance to
Frankfurt, while KIA’s building is located in Frankfurt’s city. Both companies have a similar strategy
and a similar organizational structure. Why should one company look for more representativeness than
the other? According to interview results, this was just coincidence. There simply was no site available
in Frankfurt’s city area when Hyundai wanted to settle down.
LG and Samsung both established a regional hub in and around London, having placed their regional
headquarters, sales subsidiaries and design centers there. Design is, along with technical innovation, one




 Technological research is still concentrated in the
home countries. But each company established a global design network to develop new designs for their
products. London is one of the design hotspots in Europe, offering an excellent skill base.
For technical R&D, Samsung chose London while LG selected Paris. Samsung’s R&D operations were
established along with the production operations in the UK and were meant to provide R&D support for
the products sold in Europe. The R&D operations were placed in the UK at the time when the manufac-
turing complex in Wynyard was enlarged, but they were not placed in the vicinity of the manufacturing
site. The R&D operations required highly skilled workers and good infrastructure regarding communi-
cation and transport between the site and Korea. Therefore, they were located nearby London. LG’s
R&D operations are focused on one specific topic, namely the adaptation of mobile devices to European
telecommunication standards. Therefore, the proximity to the professional institutes was decisive. For
the automobile companies, the region around Frankfurt am Main constituted the European hub. In this
region, they placed their regional headquarters, sales subsidiaries and R&D center. The R&D center is




   Germany’s Role in Korean MNEs’ Geographical Configuration
 
What are the implications of these findings for Germany? Germany has been, and will continue to be, a
very important market for Korean companies due to its market volume. It was the first destination for
Korean companies in Europe. But its importance has changed along with the industries involved. For the
automobile companies, Germany has almost an emotional value. A manager from KIA stated that Ger-
many is so important for Hyundai KIA, because it is the most sophisticated and toughest market regar-
ding competitors and customers. If they prevail in Germany, they can be successful anywhere. That is
one reason why Germany has become the European hub for these companies. The electronics companies
initially placed their central activities in Germany. As a result, Germany was somewhat of the European
hub. But with time, the center of activities moved towards the UK. This move can be explained with the
UK’s leading role in the electronics industry. Some regions in Wales were especially attractive for pro-
duction and many electronic company headquarters are located in London.
Small and medium-sized companies from Korea are becoming more and more important for Germany
as a location. As aforementioned, the number of investment cases by SMEs is increasing rapidly. Com-
panies in the electronics and computer industry particularly invest in Germany. Whereas once SMEs




30 See companies’ introduction on homepages and annual reports.
31 According to our own research, only 20 % of total companies that have been founded since 2000 were founded by large con-
glomerates, the so-called Chaebols. 
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The rise of SMEs’ proportion in overall FDI is a general trend in Korea. This trend can be observed es-
pecially after the Asian financial crisis, i.e. since the end of the 1990s, following a series of economic





 However, the type of SME-related FDI in Germany is different from









 This explains why the amount
of investment by SMEs is still low compared to large companies. In Asia, for example, where invest-





For future research, Korean SMEs will become even more important than at present. Moreover, there are
indicators that a shift in industries and functions is possible. With the foundation of the Korean-German
Cooperation Committee on Science & Industrial Technology in December 2007, closer educational and
technological cooperation between Korea and Germany has been promoted. High-tech areas such as
nanotechnology, biotechnology or environmental technology are focused areas for cooperation. This












33 (4), p. 383–403.
Borghoff, T. (2005): 
 
Evolutionary theory of the globalisation of firms
 
. Wiesbaden: Gabler.
Brush, T.H., Maritan, C.A.; Karnani, A. (1999): The Plant Location Decision in Multinational Manufac-
turing Firms: An Empirical Analysis of International Business and Manufacturing Strategy Perspectives.
In: Production and Operations Management 8 (2), p. 109–132.
Cherry, J. (2001): Korean multinationals in Europe. Richmond: Curzon.
Ch’oe, K.-C. (1992): Koreanische Direktinvestitionen in Europa – Insbesondere in der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland. Göttingen: Cuvillier.
Dunning, J. (1973): The Determinants of International Production. In: Oxford Economic Papers 25 (3),
p. 289–336.
Dunning, J. (1998): Location and the Multinational Enterprise: A Neglected Factor? In: Journal of In-
ternational Business Studies 29 (1), p. 45–66.
Henderson, J.V., Ono, Y. (2005): Where do manufacturing firms locate their Headquarters? In: Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago Working Paper 2004–29.
Holmes, T. (2005): The Location of Sales Offices and the Attraction of Cities. In: Journal of Political
Economy 113 (3), p. 551–581.
Holt, J. et al. (2006): Decision Factors Influencing MNEs Regional Headquarter Location Selection
Strategy. SMG Working Paper 2006-12. Frederiksberg.
Hur, J.-Y. (2007): An Analysis of the Characteristics and Determinants of South Korean FDI Outflows
to CEE. In: Jovanovic, M. et al. (eds.): System transformation in comparative perspective – Affinity and
diversity in institutional, structural and cultural patterns. Münster: LIT, p. 435–460.
32 See Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (2006), p. 13.
33 See Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (2006), p. 13.
34 Own research according to data from Korea Eximbank, Handelsregister (Germany’s company register), press releases, newspaper
articles and companies’ homepages.
35 According to data from Korea Eximbank.20               Chan-Mi STRÜBER: Germany’s Role in the FDI Configuration of Korean MNEs
Hyun, J. (2003): Korean Automotive Foreign Direct Investment in Europe – The Effects of Economic
Integration on Motivations and Patterns of FDI and Industrial Location. Hampshire, New York: Pal-
grave Macmillan.
Johanson, J., Vahlne, J. (1990): The mechanism of internationalisation. In: International Marketing
Review 7 (4), p. 11–24.
Kim, Y.-C., Choi, Y. (2004): The Theory of Korea Foreign Direct Investment. In: Turner, J.A., Kim, Y.-
C. (eds.): Globalisation and Korean foreign investment. Aldershot, Hants: Ashgate, p. 17–38.
Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (2006): Hae-wae tu-ja baek-seo (FDI Report). Seoul.
Kuemmerle, W. (1999): The Drivers of Foreign Direct Investment into Research and Development: An
Empirical Investigation. In: Journal of International Business Studies 30 (1), p. 1–24.
Lansbury, R.D., Suh Chung-Sok, Kwon, S.-H. (2007): The Global Korean Motor Industry: The Hyundai
Motor Company’s Global Strategy. London, New York: Routledge.
Lautier, M. (2001): The International Development of the Korean Automobile Industry. In: Sachwald,
F. (ed.): Going multinational – The Korean experience of direct investment. London: Routledge, p. 207–
273.
Mariani, M. (2002): Next to Production or to Technological Clusters? The Economics and Management
of R&D Location. In: Journal of Management and Governance 6 (2), p. 131–152.
Prahalad, C.K., Doz, Y.L. (1987): The multinational mission – Balancing local demands and global
vision. New York, N.Y.: Free Press [u.a.].
Schmenner, R.W. (1979): Look Beyond the Obvious in Plant Location. In: Harvard Business Review 59
(1), p. 126–132.
Shin, S.-H. (1998): European integration and foreign direct investment in the EU – The case of the
Korean consumer electronics industry. London: Routledge.
Internet pages:
Hyundai Motor Company: Official Hyundai Motor Company Website,
http://www.hyundai-motor.com/  (9.2.2009).
Kia Motors: Homepage, http://www.kia.com/  (20.4.2008).
LG Electronics: Homepage, http://www.lge.co.kr/cokr/main/MainCmd.laf  (3.2.2009).
Samsung Electronics: Homepage, http://www.samsung.com/sec/  (5.2.2009).Bibliography               21
DUISBURGER ARBEITSPAPIERE OSTASIENWISSENSCHAFTEN
DUISBURG WORKING PAPERS ON EAST ASIAN STUDIES
Seit Juli 1995 publiziert das Institut für Ostasienwissenschaften eine eigene Reihe von Arbeitspapieren.
Sie werden in begrenzter Zahl kostenlos abgegeben und sind zudem über Internet abrufbar.
Since July, 1995, the Institute of East Asian Studies publishes its own series of working papers which are
available free of charge and can be called up on the Internet.






Internet download: http://www.in-east.de/ → Publications → Green Series
No. 59 / 2004  Christian Göbel, Anja-D. Senz (eds.):
Come by the Wind. Li Fan’s Story in Bunyun Election
No. 60 / 2004  Thomas Heberer, Anja-D. Senz (eds.):
Feldforschung in Asien. Erlebnisse und Ergebnisse aus der Sicht politikwissenschaft-
licher Ostasienforschung
No. 61 / 2004  Thomas Heberer, Nora Sausmikat:
Bilden sich in China Strukturen einer Zivilgesellschaft heraus?
No. 62 / 2004  Jun Imai:
The Rise of Temporary Employment in Japan: Legalisation and Expansion of a Non-
Regular Employment Form
No. 63 / 2005  Thorsten Nilges:
Zunehmende Verschuldung durch Mikrokredite: Auswertung eines Experiments in 
Südindien
No. 64 / 2005  Thomas Heberer, Christian Göbel (Hg.):
Task Force: Zivilgesellschaftliche Entwicklungen in China
No. 65 / 2006  Werner Pascha und Cornelia Storz (Hg.):
Workshop Organisation und Ordnung der japanischen Wirtschaft V – Themenschwer-
punkt: Deutschlandjahr in Japan – Eine Zwischenbilanz
No. 66 / 2006  Momoyo Hüstebeck:
Park Geun-hye: Als Präsidententochter zur ersten Staatspräsidentin Südkoreas?
No. 67 / 2006  Momoyo Hüstebeck:
Tanaka Makiko: Scharfzüngige Populistin oder populäre Reformerin?
No. 68 / 2006  Thomas Heberer:
Institutional Change and Legitimacy via Urban Elections? People’s Awareness of Elec-
tions and Participation in Urban Neighbourhoods (Shequ)22               Chan-Mi STRÜBER: Germany’s Role in the FDI Configuration of Korean MNEs
No. 69 / 2006  Christian Göbel:
The Peasant’s Rescue from the Cadre? An Institutional Analysis of China’s Rural Tax 
and Fee Reform
No. 70 / 2006  Werner Pascha, Cornelia Storz (Hg.):
Workshop Institutionen in der Entwicklung Ostasiens I – Offenheit und Geschlossen-
heit asiatischer Wirtschaftssysteme
No. 71 / 2006  Norifumi Kawai:
Spatial Determinants of Japanese Manufacturing Firms in the Czech Republic
No. 72 / 2007  Werner Pascha, Cornelia Storz, Markus Taube (eds.):
Workshop Series on the Role of Institutions in East Asian Development – Institutional 
Foundations of Innovation and Competitiveness in East Asia
No. 73 / 2007  Norifumi Kawai, Manja Jonas:
Ownership Strategies in Post-Financial Crisis South-East Asia: The Case of Japanese 
Firms
No. 74 / 2008  Markus Taube:
Ökonomische Entwicklung in der VR China – Nachholendes Wachstum
No. 75 / 2008  Thomas Heberer:
Task Force: Entwicklungspolitik in China: Herausforderungen, Lösungsstrategien und 
deutsch-chinesische Entwicklungszusammenarbeit
No. 76 / 2008  YU Keping:
China’s Governance Reform from 1978 to 2008
No. 77 / 2008  Werner Pascha, Uwe Holtschneider (Hg.):
Task Force: Corporate Social Responsibility in Japan und Österreich
No. 78 / 2008 Werner Pascha, Cornelia Storz:
How are Markets Created? The Case of Japan’s Silver Market
No. 79 / 2009 Thomas Heberer, Anja-D. Senz (eds.):
Task Force: Entwicklungspolitik und -strategien in Ostasien am Beispiel der 
chinesischen Umweltpolitik
No. 80 / 2009 Chan-Mi Strüber:
Germany’s Role in the Foreign Direct Investment Configuration of Korean Multinatio-
nal Enterprises in Europe